Abstract-With the wide deployment of cloud computing in many business enterprises as well as science and engineering domains, high quality security services are increasingly critical for processing workflow applications with sensitive intermediate data. Unfortunately, most existing worklfow scheduling approaches disregard the security requirements of the intermediate data produced by workflows, and overlook the performance impact of encryption time of intermediate data on the start of subsequent workflow tasks. Furthermore, the idle time slots on resources, resulting from data dependencies among workflow tasks, have not been adequately exploited to mitigate the impact of data encryption time on workflows' makespans and monetary cost. To address these issues, this paper presents a novel task-scheduling framework for security sensitive workflows with three novel features. First, we provide comprehensive theoretical analyses on how selectively duplicating a task's predecessor tasks is helpful for preventing both the data transmission time and encryption time from delaying task's start time. Then, we define workflow tasks' latest finish time, and prove that tasks can be completed before tasks' latest finish time by using cheapest resources to reduce monetary cost without delaying tasks' successors' start time and workflows' makespans. Based on these analyses, we devise a novel scheduling approach with selective tasks duplication, named SOLID, incorporating two important phases: 1) task scheduling with selectively duplicating predecessor tasks to idle time slots on resources; and 2) intermediate data encrypting by effectively exploiting tasks' laxity time. We evaluate our solution approach through rigorous performance evaluation study using both randomly generated workflows and some real-world workflow traces. Our results show that the proposed SOLID approach prevails over existing algorithms in terms of makespan, monetary costs and resource efficiency.
Abstract-With the wide deployment of cloud computing in many business enterprises as well as science and engineering domains, high quality security services are increasingly critical for processing workflow applications with sensitive intermediate data. Unfortunately, most existing worklfow scheduling approaches disregard the security requirements of the intermediate data produced by workflows, and overlook the performance impact of encryption time of intermediate data on the start of subsequent workflow tasks. Furthermore, the idle time slots on resources, resulting from data dependencies among workflow tasks, have not been adequately exploited to mitigate the impact of data encryption time on workflows' makespans and monetary cost. To address these issues, this paper presents a novel task-scheduling framework for security sensitive workflows with three novel features. First, we provide comprehensive theoretical analyses on how selectively duplicating a task's predecessor tasks is helpful for preventing both the data transmission time and encryption time from delaying task's start time. Then, we define workflow tasks' latest finish time, and prove that tasks can be completed before tasks' latest finish time by using cheapest resources to reduce monetary cost without delaying tasks' successors' start time and workflows' makespans. Based on these analyses, we devise a novel scheduling approach with selective tasks duplication, named SOLID, incorporating two important phases: 1) task scheduling with selectively duplicating predecessor tasks to idle time slots on resources; and 2) intermediate data encrypting by effectively exploiting tasks' laxity time. We evaluate our solution approach through rigorous performance evaluation study using both randomly generated workflows and some real-world workflow traces. Our results show that the proposed SOLID approach prevails over existing algorithms in terms of makespan, monetary costs and resource efficiency.
Index Terms-Cloud computing, data security, security-sensitive, data encryption, workflow, task duplication, scheduling Ç
INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing has become a revolutionary paradigm by enabling on-demand provisioning of applications, platforms, or computing resources for customers based on a "pay-as-you-go" utility computing model [1] , [2] . In this model, cloud service providers manage large-scale heterogeneous virtual machines (VMs) to process customers' applications. Further, the available VMs in cloud platforms can be scaled up and down dynamically. Motivated by the reasonable price, rapid elasticity, and shifting responsibility of maintenance, backups, and management to cloud providers [3] , [4] , [5] , nowadays, an increasing number of applications have been deployed to clouds ranging from business, government to various science and engineering fields [6] , [7] .
Although cloud computing provides all these benefits, a number of potential users or organizations are still reluctant to adopt clouds [8] , [9] . According to several surveys, perceived lack of security is one of the main reasons discouraging users from employing cloud platforms to process their applications [10] , because the loss of some sensitive data may cause the loss of interest and property for organizations. What is worse, if these data are strongly securitysensitive, their disclosure will cause irreparable consequences [11] . Therefore, it is critical to provide a set of security services to ensure data security when running applications in clouds.
Among the programming paradigms available for supporting the process of applications on cloud platforms, workflow that comprise of a large number of tasks and the data dependencies between the tasks, typically modeled as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), is an attractive paradigm [12] , [13] , [14] . Notably, the processing of workflows is generally computing-and data-intensive with large volume of data being generated and transmitted. Furthermore, the intermediate data of these workflow applications is sensitive and need to be secured [11] , [15] . The following are two classical examples of these workflow applications in clouds.
1) Image processing applications [15] . In order to extract meaningful information from large numbers of images, imagery processing involves multiple dependent stages of parallel processing (e.g., preprocess, image segment, image object merging, image object classification, etc.) [6] , [16] , which is a typical workflow. In addition, original image data is often collected from a variety of sensors (e.g., satellite, aerial, smart phone), and many images collected have specific security concerns [15] . Study [15] also pointed out that when processing image applications in clouds, data confidentiality and data integrity need to be guaranteed by cryptographic means. 2) Epigenomics applications [6] . The procedure of an epigenomics application consists of many steps, and each single step of this procedure includes multiple sub-tasks. Thus, the procedure of epigenomics applications can be modelled as a workflow application. Often, biological or human DNA sequence data in the procedure are related to personal privacy, and they are sensitive and need to be secured [13] . To guarantee data confidentiality and integrity, deploying epigenomics applications in clouds also needs to be implemented by cryptographic means [15] . When deploying these workflows with sensitive intermediate data in clouds, the security threatens may arise from two sources: the cloud providers and mischievous users [11] . The cloud providers are certainly aware of the users' data, and these data may be leaked or even sold by some malicious cloud providers. In addition, the resources in cloud platforms are shared with massive users, and such sharing features will lead to the consequences that users' data could easily be stolen or tampered by evil users [10] .
To guarantee data security for processing workflows, it is a feasible and strongly advisable way to encrypt intermediate data before transmitting among VMs or storing to the cloud [15] , [17] . Although encrypting intermediate data can satisfy workflows' security requirements, the data encryptions will inevitably cause time overheads [18] , [19] , [20] . Specifically, security requirements of each intermediate data can be divided into several types, such as confidentiality and integrity. Each security requirement of each intermediate data can be implemented by many cryptographic instances with different computation time and security strengths. For instance, encryption algorithms IDEA and RC4 are two cryptographic instances for confidentiality service. The study [19] , [20] shows that IDEA has stronger security strength than RC4, while IDEA is more costly than RC4 with respect to computation time. In particular, the time overheads of data encryptions will delay the start of tasks waiting for these intermediate data, which may recursively propagate to a number of tasks including not only their successor tasks, but also those tasks scheduled after them and their successor tasks.
Motivation. Task duplication is helpful for preventing both the data transmission time and encryption time from delaying workflow tasks' start. The inherent reason is that when workflow tasks and their successor tasks are running on the same VMs, the output data of these tasks' duplicating execution can be used by their successor tasks directly without the data transmission and encryption. To guarantee data security, only the output data of tasks' original execution will be encrypted before being stored or transmitted. However, existing research on deploying workflows in clouds have not adequately considered the security requirements of the intermediate data of workflows, and employed task duplication to solve the impact of data encrypt time on workflow execution. To address the limitations, we study how to schedule workflow tasks to VMs with selectively duplicating tasks into idle time slots, resulting from data dependencies between tasks, to minimize the start time of workflow tasks, which can further minimize both the makespan and the monetary cost for workflow while improving VMs' resource utilization. Moreover, we also explore tasks' laxity time to encrypt intermediate data of each task' original execution to guarantee data security with minimal increase in their makespans and monetary costs.
Contributions. The key contributions of this work are:
theoretic analyses of minimizing tasks' start time by selectively duplicating their predecessors, and delaying the completion of workflow tasks to reduce monetary cost without delaying their successors' start and workflows' makespans. a novel scheduling approach with selective tasks duplication, named SOLID, which is devised to schedule workflow tasks based on theoretically derived guidelines to minimize both the makespans and monetary costs for executing workflows in clouds while improving VMs' resource utilization. a cryptographic instance choosing strategy that is integrated into SOLID to exploit tasks' laxity time for encrypting their output data such that guaranteeing workflows' security requirements with minimal increase in their makespans and monetary costs. a thorough performance analysis of our proposed SOLID through experiments on randomly generated test workflows as well as real-world workflow traces. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The related work is summarized in Section 2. Section 3 presents the scheduling model and the problem formulation. The scheduling algorithm for workflows is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 conducts extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of our algorithm. Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary and future directions.
RELATED WORK
Over the last two decades, considerable research has been conducted using meta-heuristics to solve the workflow scheduling problem. For instance, Zhu et al. extended NSGA-II to optimize both makespan and cost for executing workflow in cloud [21] . Rodriguez et al. presented an algorithm based on particle swarm optimization (PSO) with the aims to minimize the execution cost of workflows while meeting their deadlines [22] . Also, Talukder et al. employed differential evolution (DE) to generate a set of trade-offs between makespan and cost for executing workflow on global grids [23] . However, these guided-random-search based approaches are with high time complexity, which makes them less useful in real cloud platforms that need to obtain schedule decisions rapidly.
In addition, a number of heuristic approaches have been explored by researchers tackling the workflow scheudling problem. Broadly, these heuristics can be categorized as: list-based, clustering-based, and duplication-based heuristics. For example, Durillo et al. extended the workflow scheduling algorithm, heterogeneous earliest finish time, to deal with the conflicting objectives: makespan and cost [24] . Lee et al. developed an algorithm MER to trade makespan increase and resource usage reduction for a workflow schedule generated by any scheduling algorithm [25] . Fard et al. proposed a truthful mechanism to achieve good tradeoffs between makespan and monetary cost for running workflows in commercial clouds [26] . Abrishami et al. proposed two cluster-based workflow scheduling algorithms to optimize execution cost of workflow while meeting its deadline [27] . However, the heuristic approaches above do not make full use of idle time slots on resources to duplicate workflow tasks. So far, there also exist some work investigating the task duplication approaches. For example, Zong et al. proposed two duplication-based scheduling algorithms to improve the performance and energy efficiency in clusters [28] . Choudhury et al. presented a hybrid approach, based on duplicating critical tasks [29] . However, the existing duplication-based heuristics in the context of clusters and embedded systems typically ignore the security issue.
Since the security threatens of data in cloud environments are escalating and convinced, several recent studies have implemented some measures to guarantee the data security. For instance, Wei et al. proposed a basic protocol to guarantee data storage security and computation auditing security [9] . Liu et al. developed a data placement strategy to dynamically allocate the intermediate data when running workflows according to security services of the cloud service providers [11] . Qiu et al. proposed an ILPbased method to choose cryptographic instances for the data generated by executing workflows and meet their schedulability [19] . However, the existing security approaches do not make full use of idle time slots to duplicate workflow tasks so as to advance the start time of workflow tasks and workflows' makespans. In addition, these approaches rarely exploit tasks' laxity time to encrypt their output data which makes the encryption time seriously delay workflows' makespans.
Unlike the aforementioned approaches, in this study we explore the existing idle time slots on VMs to duplicate tasks selectively, striving to minimize both the makespans and monetary costs for executing workflows while improving VMs' resource utilization. Moreover, workflow tasks' laxity time is also exploited to encrypt their output data to guarantee workflows' security requirements with minimal increase in their makespans and costs.
In addition, preliminary results of our project were presented as papers [30] , [31] , [32] . Compared with the conference papers, this journal submission has included significant new technical developments.
MODELLING AND FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce the models for cloud platform, workflow applications with security-sensitive intermediate data, and the data security. Then, we formulate workflow scheduling problem that takes the workflows' security requirements into account. To improve the readability, we sum up the main notation used throughout this paper in Table 1 .
Modelling

Scheduling Architecture for Cloud Platform
Similar to [26] , [27] , [33] , the scheduling architecture for cloud platform is abstractly depicted in Fig. 1 . As the figure shown, the cloud platform is illustrated in the dotted box, and the scheduler bridges the users and the cloud resources. The upper layer is the users who submit workflow applications dynamically to scheduler, while the bottom layer is cloud resources in form of virtual machines. One key component of cloud platform is the scheduler, which is responsible for scheduling workflow tasks and implementing security services for tasks' output data to satisfy user requests. In this paper, we investigate the relevant mechanisms for the scheduler in cloud platform. For the output data of each workflow task, it will be implemented by several security services before transmitting among VMs or storing to cloud. For instance, as shown in Fig. 1 , before transmitting the output data d 1 of task t 1 to task t 3 and storing data d 1 to cloud, an encrypt algorithm (denoted as E) and a hash function (denoted as H) are successively implemented to data d 1 to realize confidentiality service and integrity service. After task t 3 receives encrypted data d 1 from task t 1 , data d 1 will be decrypted (denoted as DE) and its integrity will be verified (denoted as IV). For task t 2 , it can use data d 1 before encrypting since task t 2 and t 1 are executed on the same VM, and there is no data transfer between them.
A cloud platform typically manages large-scale VMs with a broad range of types to process users' applications. Each VM type has its own price and characteristics, such as the count of CPU cores, memory size, and network bandwidth, etc. [21] . We thus define a set S ¼ fs 1 ; s 2 ; . . . ; s m g to represent all VM types, where m is the number of these types. Remarkably, there is no limit imposed on the number of VMs of each type that a cloud platform can run.
We use the symbol vm In this paper, CPU capacities that determine the execution time of workflow tasks, and the bandwidths (the bandwidths affect the data transformation time) are considered for each VM type. Communication links among VMs are modeled by two n Â n matrices denoted by bw nÂn and nl nÂn , where n denotes the count of available VMs; bw k;k 0 and nl k;k 0 , respectively represent the network bandwidth and latency between VM vm 
Security-Sensitive Workflow Model
In this section, the classical Direct Acyclic Graph model is extended to support security-sensitive workflows, which is represented as W ¼ fT; D; E; ug, T ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n g is a set of tasks that compose the workflow, and t i 2 T represents the ith task. D ¼ fd 1 ; d 2 ; . . . ; d n g is a set of intermediate data, and d i corresponds to the output data after executing task t i . Besides, the parameter sizeðd i Þ represents the size of data d i . E T Â T is a set of edges that define the dependencies among workflow tasks. An edge e ij ¼ ðt i ; t j Þ 2 E exists if there is data dependency between task t i and task t j ; t i is an immediate predecessor of task t j , and t j is an immediate successor of task t i . The predðt i Þ represents a set of all the immediate predecessors of task t i , and succðt i Þ denotes a set of all the immediate successors of task t i . A task t i cannot be executed until it gathers all of the data from its immediate predecessors. In addition, a weight wðe i;j Þ assigned with each edge e i;j 2 E represents the size of data that is generated by t i and transferred to the location where t j will be executed. u denotes the security requirement of workflow W . u is specified by users according to the sensitivity degree of the data when running workflows in cloud. The security requirement is defined on a scale from 0 to 1. We assume the very low security demand is 0.1 and the highest is 1.0. As there exist many VM types in an IaaS platform, the execution time of a task (e.g., t i ) on different VM types is not the same. We utilize factor F ðs u Þ to describe the above features. The factor F ðs u Þ of VM type s u is set to be one if tasks' execution time can be minimized on the VMs with type s u . For a certain VM type s u , its factor F ðs u Þ is defined as the ratio of task's execution time on a VM with type s u and the task's minimal execution time. Assume met i is the minimal execution time of task t i , its execution time Fig. 2 shows an example of DAG for a workflow, consisting of five tasks from t 1 to t 5 . The DAG vertices related to tasks in T are represented by circles, while the output data of each workflow task are shown using rectangular shapes. The directed edges starting from data to tasks represent the data dependencies among tasks.
Data Security Service Model
Currently, sensitive data is confronted with security threats in cloud environments [9] , [10] , [11] , and data encryption enables data owners to guarantee the security of their data [15] . Traditionally, confidentiality, integrity, and availability are three security goals for sensitive data. Since the data availability in today's cloud environments is typically addressed through non-cryptographic means [15] , we attempt to implement the two security services (confidentiality and integrity) to workflows' intermediate data before transmitting among VMs or storing to the cloud, such that ensuring the security of these intermediate data.
For each intermediate data of workflows, each security service can be implemented by multiple cryptographic instances. The cryptographic instance sets for confidential, integrity services are denoted as CI cs ¼ fci NðisÞ g, respectively. The subscript NðjÞ; j 2 fcs; isg represents the count of cryptographic instances for jth security service. For example, if j refers to confidential service (i.e., j ¼ cs), NðjÞ denotes the count of cryptographic instances for confidential service.
In order to optimize the security service of workflows, quantitative model is needed to measure security strengths and computational overheads of different cryptographic instances. A certain cryptographic instance ci j l 2 CI j ; j 2 fcs; isg can be modelled as ci Table 2 , and that of hash functions for integrity service are shown in Table 3 . Indeed, how to accurately measure the quantity value for each cryptographic instance in distributed computing environments is still a challenge and open issue [19] , [35] . Since a way of measuring quantity value for each cryptographic instance is out of the scope of this study, we choose widely-used quantity values for these cryptographic instances in existing work [11] , [18] , [19] , [20] . Similar to [11] , [19] , [20] , the security strengths of these cryptographic instances are normalized in a range from 0 to 1. For these cryptographic instances, their computational overheads are measured on a real VM, who is configurated with one CPU (3.3 GHz 2 cores), 2.0 G memory and 400 G disk storage.
Figs. 3a and 3b respectively show the computational overheads for five encryption algorithms and five hash functions. Based on the data in Fig. 3 , we calculate the speeds (MB/s) for these cryptographic instances, which are illustrated in the fourth column of Tables 2 and 3 .
Problem Formulations
We use a binary variable x j i;l to denote whether the lth cryptographic instance is selected to implement the jth (j 2 fcs; isg) security service for data d i
Since one kind of security service requirement of each intermediate data can be implemented by only one cryptographic instance, it comes to the following constraint: 
For a given intermediate data d i , the computational overhead of its jth (j 2 fcs; isg) security service is
where sizeðd i Þ is the size of data set d i . Consequently, the security overhead of data set d i can be calculated as coðiÞ ¼ The exception is that when both tasks t i and t p are executed on the same VM, i.e., rðt p Þ ¼ rðt i Þ, the data transferring time tt p;i becomes zero [25] .
Similar to [34] , the data transfer time tt p;i from task t p to task t i can be calculated according to 
where nl rðtpÞ;rðt i Þ and bw rðtpÞrðt i Þ denote the network latency and bandwidth between VM rðt p Þ and VM rðt i Þ; wðe i pj Þ is the size of data that be transferred from task t p to task t i .
For intermediate data d i , the security strength of its jth (j 2 fcs; isg) security service can be calculated as
Similar to [18] , [20] , in order to guarantee the minimum strength of each security service that implemented to a 
where w j i represents the weight of the jth security service requirement of d i . For each intermediate data, the weights of its three security service requirements satisfy the formula P k2ðcs;is;asÞ w j i ¼ 1. Obviously, if one security requirement is more important, the related weight will be larger.
So far, there exist two main ways to calculate the overall security strength for all the output data of a task set. The first way is to obtain the sum of security strength of each output data [11] , [20] . The second way is a risk-free probability based model that defines the overall security strength of the whole application as the product of security strength of each output data [18] , [19] , [35] . In this paper, we choose the second way. But, the deficiency of the second way is that with the increase in the number of data set (denoted as n), the overall security strength of the application decrease continuously, since security strength of each output data is normalized from 0 and 1. In order to avoid the above shortcoming, we define the 1=n power of the product as the overall security strength SecðW Þ of the workflow application, which is formulated as follows:
In order to satisfy the security requirement of a workflow application, we have the following constraint:
Based on the aforementioned constraints in Equations (2), (5), (8) , and (11), the primary optimization objective is to minimize the makespan for running the workflow W . The makespan can be defined as the overall time to execute the whole workflow by considering the finish time of the last completed task [36] , so we have Minimize max
Apart from the makespan, monetary cost is considered as an important factor of the cloud services, which can greatly improve the competitiveness and attractiveness of cloud service providers. Thus, we consider to minimize the monetary cost for running workflow W as follows:
where jVMj denotes the total number of VMs used to run the workflow W , and tp k is the working period of VM vm su k . In addition, pursuing high utilization of available resources is a challenging problem when executing workflows in IaaS clouds. Another goal in this paper is to maximize the average resource utilization of VMs. This optimization objective can be written as
where wt k and tt k represent the working time and the total active time (including working time and idle time) of vm s u k . When a task is scheduled to the same VM as its predecessor tasks, this task can directly use the output data of its predecessor tasks without the data transmission and encryption. Besides, when scheduling a task, its predecessor task has been scheduled to different VMs. Thus, selectively duplicating a task's predecessor tasks to the same VM as it will be scheduled to is helpful for advancing its start time and finish time, which can further minimize workflow makespan in formula (12) . Shortening workflow tasks' finish time means shortening the working time of VMs, which can reduce the monetary cost as formula (13) . In addition, the monetary cost can be further reduced without delay workflow makespan via scheduling non-critical tasks to VMs with both less processing capacity and price. It is natural to improve the resource utilization in formula (14) by duplicating workflow tasks to idle time slots on resources.
DUPLICATION METHOD
Generally, the workflow scheduling problem is known to be NP-complete [21] , [37] . Thereby, we propose a heuristic scheduling algorithm with the aim of providing nearoptimal solutions.
Theoretical Analysis
Intuitively, task duplication can prevent both the data transmission time and encryption time from delaying workflow tasks' start. To help the algorithm design in Section 4.2, we attempt to demonstrate how to duplicate tasks' predecessors to minimize their start time. Theorem 1 focuses on a simple scenario that how to minimize the start time of a task with only one predecessor task. An example in Fig. 4 is used to illustrate Theorem 1. Assume task t i has only one predecessor task t 1 as shown in Fig. 4a, and 
To demonstrate the advantage of task replication in minimizing the start time of workflow task with multiple predecessor tasks, we prove in Theorem 2 that the task's minimum start time in the absence of task duplication. This serves as a comparison object. Theorem 2. Suppose predðt i Þ ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t k g and ft 1 þ coð1Þ þ tt 1;i ! ft 2 þ coð2Þþ tt 2;i ! Á Á Á ! ft k þ coðkÞ þ tt k;i > 0, if the time overheads coðjÞ of output data of each task cannot be deleted, the minimal start time of task t i is mst i ¼ min From conclusions (2.1) and (2.2), we gain that
Therefore, we can conclude that mst i ¼ min
t j Þ; ft lþ1 þ coðl þ 1Þ þ tt lþ1;i g is the minimal start time of task t i .
t u
An example of Theorem 2 is illustrated in Fig. 5 . As shown in Fig. 5a , the predecessor task set of task t i is assumed to be predðt i Þ ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ; t 4 g. The three elements of each three tuple above the four predecessor tasks refer to the task execution time, the data encrypt time, and the data transmission time, respectively. For instance, the three tuple ð20; 10; 60Þ above task t 1 means that task t 1 's finish time is 20s, the encrypt time of t 1 's output data is 10s, and data transmission time between t 1 and t i is 60s. According to Theorem 2, we can gain l m ¼ 2 and mst i ¼ maxfftð[ 2 j¼1 t j Þ; ft 3 þ coð3Þþ tt 3;i g ¼ maxf60; 80g ¼ 80s. Fig. 5b shows a schedule example for the sample workflow to minimize start time of task t i . Now we attempt to analyse how to selectively duplicate a task's predecessors to minimize its start time. Theorem 3. Suppose predðt i Þ ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t k g and ft 1 þ coð1Þ þ tt 1;i ! ft 2 þ coð2Þ þ tt 2;i ! Á Á Á ! ft k þ coðkÞ þ tt k;i > 0, by duplicating subset of predðt i Þ, the start time of task t i can be minimized as mst i ¼ min
Proof. Let l m ¼ arg min
tt lþ1;i g, where ft Ã ð S l j¼1 t j Þ ¼ P l j¼1 ft j , and k is the number of task t i 's predecessor tasks, i.e., k ¼ jpredðt i Þj.
If the predecessor task subset A ¼ ft 1 ; . . . ; t l m g is scheduled to the same VM vm s u k , and task t i is appended after them. In addition, all the tasks in A are duplicated to another VMs to execute and encrypt their output data. Thus, the data encrypting time of tasks in A on VM vm s u k is removed, i.e., ft Ã ð S lm j¼1 t j Þ ¼ P lm j¼1 ft j . Then, the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.
Consider the sample workflow in Fig. 5a . Based on Theorem 3, we give an schedule example of minimizing the start time of task t i , as shown in Fig. 6 Notably, a task's start time is determined by the latest data arrival time of its predecessor tasks, and other predecessor tasks can be completed later as long as their data arrival time are not the latest. Specifically, it is unnecessary to minimize the finish time of all workflow tasks to minimize the makespan. We use an example to shows the above mentioned case as shown in Fig. 7a .
In Fig. 7a , the sample workflow consists of three tasks from t 1 to t 3 . Assume task t 2 has been scheduled and its finish time is 200s, and the data encrypt time of task t 2 is 20s. Excepting t 2 , other two tasks have not been scheduled, and assume the transmission time tt 1;3 is 10s. Since the data constraint between task t 2 and t 3 , the earliest start time of t 2 should be more than 220s. Obviously, if task t 1 's finish time plus the data encrypt time of t 1 is less than 210s, the completion of task t 1 will not delay the start time of task t 3 .
In this paper, for a task t i , its latest finish time lft i is defined as the time, before which task t i is completed, the start time of all successor tasks of task t i will not be delayed. 
Since the encrypt time of task t j 's output data d j is unknown before scheduling, the parameter coðiÞ max is utilized to represent the maximal encrypt time of data d j .
In order to clarify the calculation of lft i , we give example as shown in Fig. 7b does not delay the start time of its successor tasks. Thus, Theorem 4 is proved. t u Theorem 4 points out that not all workflow tasks need to be finished as soon as possible. Therefore, workflow tasks should be scheduled to VMs with the minimum cost, while ensuring their latest finish time, such that minimizing both makespan and monetary cost for executing workflows.
Algorithm Design
In this section, we propose a novel scheduling approach with selective tasks duplication, named SOLID, for scheduling workflows in clouds. To facilitate the presentation of our proposed approach, we introduce some rules as follows:
Rule 1. The waiting task on a VM is allowed to start as soon as executing task on the same VM and all its predecessors have finished.
Rule 2. A VM will be released when it satisfies the two following conditions: 1) it is idle, i.e., it completes all the tasks that are mapped to it and data transmission; 2) the lease time of this VM is the integer amount of time units.
Specifically, the SOLID integrates the aforementioned assumptions and theorems to minimize the makespan and cost for workflows, while guaranteeing their security requirements. Algorithm 1 outlines the overall process of SOLID algorithm for scheduling a workflow. In SOLID, the ready workflow tasks are scheduled according to their ranks that are calculated as follows:
if predðt i Þ != f; met i ; otherwise:
where mtt p;i denotes the maximum transmission time of data from task t p to task t i ; and met i represents the maximum execution time of task t i . As shown in Algorithm 1, after initializing the available VM list (Line 1), algorithm SOLID finds out all the ready tasks to initialize the readyTL (Line 2). Then, in each iteration, the ready task in readyTL with the maximal rank will be scheduled to corresponding VMs by function ScheduleTaskByDuplication() (Line 6). Moreover, after the scheduling of tasks in readyTL, part or all of their successor tasks will become ready according to Definition 4. At this time, each task that just becomes ready is given a rank (Line 10) and is added into the readyTL (Line 11). The above steps, i.e., the loop from Lines 4 to 11, will be iterated until all workflow tasks are scheduled. After all the workflow tasks have been scheduled, an indispensable part of the algorithm SOLID is to call the function EncryptData() to encrypt the intermediate data of workflows (Line 12).
In order to facilitate the function ScheduleTaskByDuplication(), we make the following definitions. The start time st i;k of task t i on VM vm su k is defined as follows: It should be noted that when adding a new VM, the time overhead is about one minute, which can not be ignored [3] . In order to prevent these time overheads from delaying the start time of task, the new VMs are initiated in advance. The start-up time (sut k ) of new VM vm su k is calculated as
where ct denotes the current time; t i represents the first task on this new VM; and th k indicates the time overhead of initiating VM vm su k . Thus, the available time at k of a new VM vm su k is at k ¼ sut k þ th k .
Obviously, the finish time ft i;k of task t i on VM vm su k can be calculated as
For task t i , its execution time on a specified VM is a fixed value, the way to advance its finish time is to reduce its start time. The task t i can start execution on a candidate VM vm s u k if and only if it receives the data from all of its immediate predecessor tasks, so as to meet precedence constraints. Fortunately, based on Theorems 1 and 3, duplicating partial or all of task t i 's predecessor tasks to the same VM as t i can avoid the data encrypt time of predecessor tasks and the communication time between duplicated predecessor tasks and task t i , to reduce task t i 's start time. In order to duplicate task t i 's predecessor tasks efficiently, we define the predecessor task whose data arrive at task t i at the latest time among all the predecessor tasks, as the bottleneck predecessor task bptðt i Þ of task t i , i.e., bptðt i Þ ¼ arg max t p 2predðt i Þ fft p;rðpÞ þ tt p;i þ coðpÞ max g.
More specifically, Theorems 1 and 3 provide that the duplication of bptðt i Þ, the bottleneck predecessor task of task t i , on the same VM as task t i is scheduled to, potentially helps in advancing task t i 's start time, such that improving task t i 's finish time.
To duplicate the bottleneck predecessor task bptðt i Þ of task t i on the same VM with task t i , a proper time slot on the VM must be found. Our approach is to scan through the whole span of the VM to find the earliest time slot that is large enough to accommodate bptðt i Þ provided that the precedence constraints are not violated. Definition below governs the selection of a suitable idle time slot. Besides, the predicted cost pc i;k of task t i is defined as
where at k denotes the time at which VM vm s u k is available for task t i , i.e., at k is the finish time of the last task on vm s u k . As shown in Algorithm 2, the function ScheduleTaskByDuplication() receives a task, namely t i , as input and is responsible for scheduling this task to a VM, with the goal of either completing task t i before its latest finish time with the minimum predicted cost, or completing task t i as early as possible without consideration of monetary cost (Lines 4-20) . This function first strives to select a VM that can finish task t i before its latest finish time with the minimum predicted cost (Lines 10-11). If no such initiated VM is selected, the initiated VM that can finish task t i at the earliest time is also selected (Line 9). Moreover, to advance the start time of task t i , this function will iteratively duplicate the bottleneck predecessor task t b of task t i on VM vm su k to reduce the data arrival time of t b until task t b has been scheduled to vm su k or there is no suitable idle time slot on vm su k (Lines 12-16 ). In the above process, if there is no VM that can complete task t i before its latest finish time, the function ScaleUpVm() will be called to check whether adding a new VM can complete task t i earlier than all at the initiated VMs or before its latest finish time (Line 18). Finally, this function duplicates task t i 's predecessors based on the duplication plan dupPlan (Line 19), and assigns t i to the selected VM selVm (Line 20).
As depicted in Algorithm 3, function ScaleUpVm() is designed to select a VM type s Ã in such a way that a new VM with this type either completes t i before its latest finish time with the minimum predicted cost, or completes t i earlier than all the initiated VMs. In addition, to advance the start time of task t i , this function also considers to duplicate some predecessor tasks of t i (Lines 10-14) . If an appropriate VM type is selected, i.e., s Ã ! ¼NULL (Line 15), then this function will rent one more VM with type s Ã (Line 16) and add this new VM into the initiated VM list (Line 17).
In order to meet workflows' security requirements, function EncryptData() is devised to select an appropriate cryptographic instance for each security service requirement of each intermediate data. Only the output data of original execution of each task will be transmitted and stored, and the output data of the duplicating execution of each task will be deleted after being used by its successor tasks. Thus, this function only select appropriate cryptographic instances to encrypt the output data of original execution of each task. Specifically, tasks' laxity time is fully exploited by EncryptData() to achieve minimal increase in both makespan and cost. The laxity time l i of task t i is defined as that if l i is larger than the time overhead of encrypting the intermediate data produced by task t i , this time overhead of encrypting data will not delay the start time of any other tasks, which can be calculated as follows:
where t a denotes the task that is executed just after task t i on the same VM, and st a;rðtaÞ denotes the start time of t a .
The pseudocode for function EncryptData() is shown in Algorithm 4. Update the cryptographic instance for the jÃth security service requirement of data d iÃ ;
Function EncryptData() in Algorithm 4, first sorts the cryptographic instances for each security service requirement by their security strengths (Line 1). Then, for each intermediate data, cryptographic instances with the minimal security strength (larger than or equal to the required security strength) are implemented for confidentiality service and integrity service (Lines 2-6). If the above cryptographic instances are unable to meet workflow's overall security requirement, the cryptographic instance for each security service of each data is updated step by step until the workflow's overall security requirement is met (Lines 7-9). To efficiently improve the security strength of the workflow with minimal increase in makspan and cost, during each iteration, the EncryptData() proceeds by updating the security service of data that leads to the maximal ratio between the increase of security strength and decrease of laxity time (Line 7).
Time Complexity Analysis
Theorem 5. The time complexity for scheduling a workflow W with algorithm SOLID is OðjT jjN vm jjN w jjN in j þ jT jjN t jþ jT jjN ca jÞ, where jT j represents the count of tasks in workflow W ; jN vm j and jN w j are the count of initiated VMs and waiting tasks on a VM; N in is the maximum in-degree of a task in W ; jN t j and jN ca j denote the number of VM types and cryptographic instances, respectively.
Proof. For function ScheduleTaskByDuplication(), it takes
OðjN in jjN w jÞ to check if a task can be scheduled to a VM (Lines 6-16, Algorithm 2). Thus, it takes OðjN vm jjN in jjN w jÞ to check all the initiated VMs. For function ScaleUpVm(), the time complexity of choosing a VM type is OðjN t jjN in jjN w jÞ. Therefore, the time complexity of function ScheduleTaskByDuplication() to schedule a task is OðjN vm jjN in jjN w j þ jN t jjN in jjN w jÞ. Based on the aforementioned analysis, the time complexity for scheduling all the tasks in W is calculated as OðjT jÞOðjN vm jjN in jj N w j þ jN t jjN in jjN w jÞ ¼ OðjT jjN vm jjN in jjN w j þ jT jjN t jjN in jj N w jÞ (Lines 1-11, Algorithm 1).
Function EncryptData() takes OðjN ca jlogðjN ca jÞ to sort the cryptographic instances (Line 1, Algorithm 4). The time complexity of initial implement of cryptographic instances for each data is jDj ¼ jT j (Lines 2-6, Algorithm 4), since data d i corresponds to output data when executing task t i . It takes time Oðjfcs; is; asgjjT jÞ ¼ OðjT jÞ to select the most appropriate data and security service (Line 8, Algorithm 4). Thus, the time complexity of updating cryptographic instances is OðjT jjN ca jÞ (Lines 7-9, Algorithm 4).
In conclusion, the time complexity of SOLID is OðjT jjN vm jjN in jjN w j þ jT jjN t jjN in jjN w jÞ þ OðjT jjN ca jÞ ¼ OðjT jjN vm jjN in jjN w j þ jT jjN t jjN in jjN w jÞ þ jT jjN ca jÞ. t u
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To demonstrate the performance of SOLID, we quantitatively compare it with a baseline algorithm: SOLID-Random (SOLID-R). We also compare them with an existing algorithm: EFT-MER [25] . As algorithm EFT-MER makes no effort to ensure data security for running workflows, to make the comparisons fair, we integrate two different encryption strategies into EFT-MER forming two variants:
EFT-MER with Exploring Laxity Time (EFT-MER-EL) and EFT-MER with random encryption strategy (EFT-MER-R).
SOLID-R. Differing from SOLID, SOLID-R adopts a random encryption strategy to encrypt the intermediate data.
During each loop from Lines 6 to 8 in Algorithm 4, this random encryption strategy randomly selects a security service requirement of an intermediate data to improve workflows' security strength.
EFT-MER. First employs the earliest finish time (EFT) strategy to generate an initial schedule for a workflow; then the strategy MER seeks to further optimize the initial workflow schedule by consolidating the tasks on resources with light workload to fill idle time slots on other resources.
EFT-MER-EL. Differing from EFT-MER, EFT-MER-EL calls the function EncryptData() in Algorithm 4 to encrypt the intermediate data after the workflow schedule has been generated by EFT-MER.
EFT-MER-R. After EFT-MER generating the workflow schedule, EFT-MER-R utilizes a random encryption strategy as algorithm SOLID-R to encrypt the intermediate data.
Since a large number of workflows with different attributes are utilized to test the aforementioned algorithms, the makespans of these workflows, produced by different algorithms, are hard to be compared directly. Thus, we normalize the makespan of each workflow as follows:
where CP is the critical path of the DAG when the minimum execution time of workflow tasks is used, and the data transmission time between tasks is ignored.
Experiment on Real-World Workflow Traces
We evaluate these algorithms based on real-world workflows including Montage, Cybershake, Epigenomics, Inspiral and SIPHT [6] . For each workflow, the details include their DAG structure, the size of data transferring and tasks' execution time. So far, these workflows have been widely used for measuring the performance of workflow scheduling algorithms, and we thus include these workflows in our experiments. The visual structures of different workflow applications are given in Fig. 8 . It can be seen from Fig. 8 that the basic components of workflows, i.e., pipeline, data aggregation, data distribution and data redistribution, are mixed in these five types of workflows. Furthermore, using their knowledge about structure and the information achieved from actual execution of these workflows on the real distributed environments, Bharathi et al. have created four different sizes for each workflow application in terms of task count [6] . These workflows are available in DAX format from their website [38] , from which each type of workflow with 100/1,000 tasks was chose for our experiments. Table 4 gives the characteristics of these workflows including the count of tasks and edges, average task execution time.
In our experiment, each intermediate data is implemented with two types of security services: confidentiality service (cs) and integrity service (is). Quantitative security strength and computational overhead of the security instances for these two types of security services are listed in Tables 2 and 3 .
In our experiment, the parameters and pricing scheme from Amazon AWS EC2 are utilized to simulate the cloud platform. Four classic types of VMs are considered in our experiments, the details are presented in Table 5 [21], [39], [40] . The billing period is 10 minutes. The number of each VM is unlimited. We assume all required softwares can be installed on every VM, such that all workflow tasks can be executed on each arbitrary VM. The average bandwidth between two VMs is a random number between 10 and 30 Mbps. Besides, the time overhead of initiated a new VM is set to one minute.
As there exist many VM types in an IaaS platform, the execution time of a task (e.g., t i ) on different VM types is not the same. We utilize parameter F ðs u Þ to describe the above features, and the execution time of task t i on different VM types is calculated as follows:
In this group of experiments, we choose CloudSim toolkit [41] as a simulation platform to compare the performance of five algorithms. Each algorithm is run independently 30 times, and the experimental results of SOLID with the comparative algorithms in the context of various real-world workflows are reported in Table 6 . The first line of the table lists ten real-world workflows, and in the next five lines, each line represents normalized makespans of these workflows produced by an algorithm. With respect to monetary cost, the performances of algorithm SOLID, SOLID-R, EFT-MER, EFT-MER-EL and EFT-MER-R are shown from seventh to eleventh lines. The last five lines are respectively used to show the resource utilizations of the five algorithms in the context of these ten workflows.
As shown in Table 6 , EFT-MER performs the best in most cases with respect to the normalized makespan and monetary costs. This is because that EFT-MER makes no effort to ensure data security for running workflows, which means that the time overheads of data encryptions are not considered in EFT-MER.
To make the comparisons fair, we compare SOLID with the baseline algorithm EFT-MER-R and the two variants of EFT-MER (i.e., EFT-MER-EL and EFT-MER-R). In term of normalized makespan, algorithm SOLID on average outperforms SOLID-R, EFT-MER-EL and EFT-MER-R by 12.30, 60.88 and 115.53 percent, respectively. This may be contributed to the following two reasons. First of all, SOLID employs the existing idle time slots on VMs to duplicate some predecessor tasks selectively, striving to minimize the start time of workflow tasks. Second, tasks' laxity time are explored by SOLID to encrypt their output data, which mitigate the impact of data encryption time on workflows' makespans. With respect to monetary cost, SOLID performs significantly better than other algorithms for all the workflows, except for CyberShake 100 and CyberShake 1000. Also, SOLID produces higher resource utilization than other algorithms on all the real-world workflows with the improvements up to 75.64 percent. These experimental results indicate that, even in the cases where SOLID produces lower normalized makespans, the monetary costs and resource utilizations by SOLID are still significantly superior to those obtained by other algorithms. For two exceptions: CyberShake 100 and CyberShake 1000, the monetary costs of SOLID and SOLID-R are higher than that of EFT-MER-EL and EFT-MER-R. This is because when adding a new VM, to advance a task's start time, many predecessor tasks of this task are duplicated on the VM by SOLID and SOLID-R, but at this time there is no idle time slot on this VM, thereby extending the working time of the new VM. Even so, in case of the above two exceptions, SOLID and SOLID-R are obviously superior to other algorithms in term of normalized makespan and resource utilization. Therefore these two cases can not proved that the algorithm SOLID and SOLID-R are incompetent. Due to the space limitation, the results and analysis of the other four sets of simulation experiments are presented in the supplementary materials, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http:// doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TPDS.2017.2678507.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper investigates the problem of scheduling workflows with security-sensitive intermediate data. We first present four theorems to minimize both the makespans and monetary costs for executing workflow applications. After that, we develop a security-aware scheduling approach, namely SOLID, striving to improve the makespans and costs of executing workflows, and resource efficiency of VMs, while guaranteeing the security requirements of workflows. To evaluate the effectiveness of SOLID, we conduct extensive simulation experiments in the context of randomly generated workflows and real-world workflow traces. Experimental results show the superiorities of SOLID compared with other related algorithms (SOLID-R, EFT-MER, EFT-MER-EL and EFT-MER-R).
In our future work, the robust task scheduling and resource management approaches for processing stream data will be investigated. In addition, to timely gain the useful information and knowledge hidden in the data with rapid growth, we will make more efforts to model the relationship between accuracy and timeless to achieve good trade-offs. " For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
